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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 60 APRIL 1962 No. 6 
THE LAZY LAWYER'S GUIDE TO SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS UNDER THE CODE 
Peter F. Coogan* 
IT is expected that few, if any, who can really qualify as "lazy lawyers" will read this paper. There is, however, an obvious 
need for a reasonably simple statement which a young Ia-wyer, for 
example, may find helpful in explaining article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code1 to the partners in his firm, or a lender's lawyer 
may use in explaining the essentials of article 9 to a borrower's 
counsel who has only occasional contact with secured transac-
tions--or, in either case, vice versa. 
It is just possible that in reading this paper for the purpose of 
enabling him to explain it to others, even the non-lazy lawyer 
may pick up a thought or two for himself. If read with that idea 
in mind the reader may change the title to "The Intelligent Law-
yer's Guide to Secured Transactions Under Article 9."2 If the 
reader lives in an area where to be lazy is to be condemned and 
to be intelligent is to be suspect, he may prefer to read this under 
the title, "Article 9: Something Old, Something New." It is not 
assumed that the lazy lawyer to whom this explanation is to be 
made is stupid-he may in fact be too intelligent to spend many 
hours in doing for himself what others may help him do in a 
few hours. 
Since eighteen states have adopted the Code, no lawyer with 
any commercial practice can any longer escape learning something 
about it.3 
• Lecturer, Harvard Law School; Member, Massachusetts Bar, Sponsors' Subcommittee 
on Article 9 of The Uniform Commercial Code, National Bankruptcy Conference. It is 
expected that this article will be a chapter in a book on article 9 by the author and 
his associates.-Ed. 
1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1958 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH CO!IIMENTS, published by 
the American Law Institute and the Commissioners on Uniform Laws (hereinafter 
cited U.C.C. with a section number, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-304). 
2 Compare INTELLIGENT '\VoMAN's GUIDE TO SOCIALISM ~ CAPITALISM by George 
Bernard Shaw (1928). 
3 The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in eighteen states. The statutes 
of the adopting states with their effective dates are as follows: Alaska Laws 1962, H.B 
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The lawyer who is too lazy, too busy, or too intelligent to worry 
today about something that may not come up for another five 
years can safely postpone obtaining anything more than a general 
knowledge of some of the Code's articles until the occasion for 
a more thorough knowledge arises. A lawyer who drafts letters 
of credit must, of course, become acquainted with the new and 
interesting set of rules for their use set forth in article 5. Counsel 
for a public warehouse will need to know how article 7 on Docu-
ments of Title changes the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act' 
and the Bills of Lading Acts.5 But a lawyer who has never had 
occasion to use a letter of credit or almost never handles a docu-
mentary transaction may be excused for not, at this time, learning 
all there is to know about article 5 or article 7. Depending upon 
his practice, a lawyer may apply the same reasoning to the neces-
sity for learning now about article 6 on bulk transfers, article 4 
on bank collections, or even article 3 on commercial paper. But 
almost every lawyer with any commercial practice deals with the 
law of sales (recodified in article 2) and one or many forms of 
chattel security law (codified for the first time in article 9). Those 
who need article 2 most will already be conversant, often by chap-
ter and verse, with its predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act.6 The 
similarities between article 2 and the old law are striking, and the 
differences not hard to pick up. Some of the words, and fewer 
of the ideas, are new, but article 2, like the Uniform Sales Act, 
obviously deals with problems of sellers and buyers. On the 
other hand, both the words and the concepts of article 9 seem 
very different from those of any similar body of non-Code law. 
Although it has absorbed two uniform laws,7 article 9 does not 
120 (Jan. 1, 1963); Ark. Acts 1961, No. 185 (Jan. I, 1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. REY. tit. 42a 
(Supp. 1959) (Oct. 1, 1961); Ga. Laws 1962, No. 713 (April I, 1963); Ill. Laws 1961, S.B. 
198 (July 1, 1962); KY. REv. STAT. § 355.1-.101 (1958) (July 1, 1960): MASS. GEN. LAws 
ANN. ch. 106 (Supp. 1958) (Oct. 1, 1958); Mich. Laws 1962, S.B. No. 1047 (Jan. I, 1964); 
N.H. REY. STAT. ANN. ch. 283a (1961) (July I, 1961): N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (Supp. 
1961) (Jan. 1, 1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 50a (Supp. 1961) (Jan. 1, 1962); N.Y. Laws 
1962, ch. 553 (Sept. 27, 1964); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1301.01 (Baldwin, 1962) (July 1, 
1962); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 1-101 (1961) (Jan. I, 1963); Ore. Laws 1961, ch. 726, 
§§ 71.1010-79.5070 (Sept. 1, 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-101 (1954) (July I, 1954): 
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. tit. 6a (Special Supp. 1961) (Jan. 2, 1962); Wyo. Laws 1961 ch. 219 
(Jan. I, 1962). 
4 3 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED (1959) [hereinafter cited as U.L.A.] 
5 4 U.L.A. (1922). 
6 I U.L.A. (1950). 
7 UNIFORM CONDmONAL SALES Acr, 2 U.L.A. (1922) and the UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS 
Ac:r, 9c U.L.A. 220 (1957). 
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follow the recognizable pattern of either of them or of any other 
single previous statute. 
If we could assume that our learner had absolutely no knowl-
edge of article 9, we could proceed directly to help him correlate 
that which he knows with that which he must now learn. But we 
must assume that by this time even our lazy lawyer has been ex-
posed to some of article 9's new language and concepts-just 
enough perhaps to puzzle him. If we are to help him understand 
article 9 with a modest effort, we must see what it is that is likely 
to make his task seem more difficult than it is. 
J. SOURCES OF CONFUSION IN ARTICLE 9 
The very first paragraph of the "Official Comments" seems to 
throw out all of the typical lawyer's knowledge of chattel security 
law. It reads: 
"This Article sets out a comprehensive scheme for the 
regulation of security interests in personal property and fix-
tures. It supersedes existing legislation dealing with such 
security devices as chattel mortgages, conditional sales, trust 
receipts, factor's liens and assignments of accounts receivable 
(see Note to Section 9-102)."8 
Our lawyer reads further: 
"Under this Article, the traditional distinctions among 
security devices, based largely on form, are not retained; the 
Article applies to all transactions intended to create security 
interests in personal property and fixtures, and the single 
term 'security interest' substitutes for the variety of descrip-
tive terms which has grown up at common law and under a 
hundred-year accretion of statutes."9 
And again: 
"Under the Article distinctions based on form ( except as 
between pledge and non-possessory interests) are no longer 
controlling. For some purposes there are distinctions based 
on the type of property which constitutes the collateral-in-
dustrial and commercial equipment, business inventory, farm 
products, consumer goods, accounts receivable, documents of 
8 A.L.I., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1958 TEXT AND COMMENTS 587 [hereinafter cited 
as U.C.C. 1958 TEXT AND COMMENTS]. 
9 Id. at 589. 
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title and other intangibles-and, where appropriate, the Arti-
cle states special rules applicable to financing transactions 
involving a particular type of property."10 
These excerpts from the comments may give to the lawyer who 
reads 9-102 for the first time the impression that he is saying 
goodbye to all of his present knowledge of chattel security law. 
The idea that he must now learn about distinctions based on the 
type of collateral is reinforced by the first sentence of its first 
operative section. This reads: 
". . . this Article applies so far as concerns any personal 
property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state 
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is in-
tended to create a security interest in personal property 
or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, 
general intangibles, chattel paper, accounts or contract 
rights; and also 
(b) to any sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel 
paper."11 
The 1958 Official Text contains a five-page catalog12 of the 
sections relating to each category of collateral, which seems to re-
inforce the reader's impression that the application of the Code's 
rules turn largely on these categories. After almost seven pages 
of text and comments on what to him seems a highly specialized 
problem of how the Code applies in multi-state transactions,13 
followed by three pages of text and comments14 telling him the 
secured transactions to which article 9 does not apply, he comes 
back to ten more pages of text and comments on definitions. This 
makes a total of about fifteen pages of text and comments on 
definitions, without counting what are probably the two most 
significant: "security interest"15 and "buyer in the ordinary 
10 Ibid. 
11 U.C.C. § 9-102 (Emphasis added). 
12 U.C.C. 1958 TEXT AND 00M!11ENTS 592-96. 
13 Id. at 597-603. 
14 Id. at 603-06. Section 9-104 excludes four types of transactions: (a) Transactions 
involving noncommercial intangible property, such as the right to damages in a tort 
action and assignment of wages. (b) Transactions, the subject matter of which is cov-
ered by a federal statute. See, e.g., Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1000, as amended, 
46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1958). (c) Transactions governed by some special bodies of law, 
for example, equipment trusts covering railway rolling stock. (d) Transactions covering 
real estate, except that the use of fixtures as security is not excluded. 
15 This is one of the few definitions which are basic. Section 1-201(37) reads as 
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course of business."16 These are defined in the front of the book, 
in 1-201(37) and 1-201(9), respectively. Nor do these fifteen pages 
include "proceeds," which is defined in 9-306. 
The meaning of some of these new definitions is so obvious 
that definition is almost superfluous. "Secured party" and "debtor" 
are common terms to describe the parties heretofore referred to 
as pledgee and mortgagee and pledgor and mortgagor, etc.; 
"security agreement" is a name for the various instruments that 
are used to create different security interests under the pledge, 
chattel mortgage and the like. But in neither place do we find 
a definition of "perfected security interest," the obtaining of which 
seems to be the object of the exercise, nor do we find a definition 
of the troublesome term "fixture." 
At this point our lawyer catches the apparent spirit of the 
game, and tries to find out just why these categories of collateral 
are so important. He picks two that sound both significant and 
reasonably familiar-"equipment"17 and "inventory."18 Must he 
follows: " 'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures which 
secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reservation of title 
by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (§ 2-401) is 
limited in effect to a reservation of a 'security interest.' The term also includes any 
interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, or contract rights which is subject to 
Article 9. The special property interest of a buyer of goods on identification of such 
goods to a contract for sale under § 2-401 is not a 'security interest,' but a buyer 
may also acquire a 'security interest' by complying with Article 9. Unless a lease or 
consignment is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a 'security 
interest' but a consignment is in any event subject to the provisions on consignment 
sales (§ 2-326). Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts 
of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make 
the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that on compliance with the 
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner 
of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does 
make the lease one intended for security.'' 
16 The definition of this term, unlike many others that seem important, contains a 
lot of substantive law. Section 1-201(9) reads as follows: "'Buyer in the ordinary course 
of business' means a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale 
to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in 
the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of 
that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. 'Buying' may be for cash or by ex-
change of other property or on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving 
goods or documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does not include 
a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt. 
17 U.C.C. § 9-109(2): "Goods are ... 'equipment' if they are used or bought for 
use primarily in business (including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a 
non-profit organization or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are 
not included in the definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer goods." 
18 U.C.C. § 9-109(4): "Goods are •.• 'inventory' if they are held by a person who 
holds them for sale or lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he 
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use a different form of security agreement19 for inventory than 
he would for equipment? Does the place or the method of filing 
depend on a determination of whether his collateral is inventory 
or equipment? After reading the elaborate definitions of the 
two terms in 9-109, he goes through the Code to determine just 
what are these distinctions based on "the type of property which 
constitutes the collateral."20 
Our lawyer goes through article 9 section by section-9-110 on 
sufficiency of description does not mention either category-nor 
does 9-111, or 9-112, or 9-113. Neither "inventory" nor "equip-
ment" is found in sections 9-201 through 9-208, or in the follow-
ing 9-301 through 9-311. Finally, in 9-312(3)21 he finds the word 
"inventory" for the first time; but its meaning here would be per-
fectly obvious without a definition. "Equipment" in the fully de-
fined sense does not appear until nearly the end of the book-
the last sentence of 9-503, and here only in connection with a 
point of less than earth-shaking consequence.22 He does find, 
however, that the place of filing does depend on whether certain 
collateral is farm products23 or consumer goods (9-401).24 Surely 
there must be some greater significance to these terms which eludes 
him. Why else would so many pages of text and comment be given 
to these definitions? 
Postponing his search for the hidden significance of these 
definitions, our lawyer looks for directions telling him how to 
create the simple, common, garden variety of security transactions 
like those he caused to be created and perfected through the use 
has so furnished them, or if they are raw materials, work in process or materials used 
or consumed in a business. Inventory of a person is not to be classified as his equipment." 
19 Section 9-105(1)(h) reads: "'Security agreement' means an agreement whicli cre-
ates or provides for a security interest." 
20 U.C.C. 1958 TEXT AND COMMENTS at 589. 
21 The requirement for obtaining a purcliase money priority in inventory is more 
stringent than that of non-inventory collateral. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4). 
22 After default, the secured party may make equipment unusable even though still 
in the debtor's possession. 
23 In effect, there can be no buyer in ordinary course of business who takes free 
of a security interest in farm products. U .C.C. § 9-307. And the place of filing will be 
local. U.C.C. § 9-401. 
24 Consumer goods is almost self-defining-goods bought primarily for personal or 
family use. U.C.C. § 9-109(1). Section 9-204(4)(b) limits the use of an after-acquired 
property clause where consumer goods are involved. As with farm products, filing is 
likely to be local; and limited protection can be obtained without filing for purcliase 
money security interests in consumer goods other than motor vehicles and fixtures. 
See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(c), 9-307(2). 
1962] SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE CODE 691 
of the pledge,25 chattel mortgage,26 or conditional sale.27 The con-
ditional sales contract has been the most used chattel security 
device over the years; its popularity is due, at least in part, to the 
fact that its use almost insures against the necessity on the part 
of either the financer or his lawyer to think through the puzzling 
business and legal problems of after-acquired property and future 
advances. Almost by definition a conditional sale covers only the 
specific property being acquired through the transaction which 
creates the security interest, and almost of necessity it protects 
only the debt created in acquiring the collateral. By the simple 
expedient of filing promptly-and even that step is not necessary 
in some jurisdictions28-the secured party protects himself against 
an attack by debtor's trustee in bankruptcy, whether as a prefer-
ence under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act or otherwise. But 
the Code seems not to contemplate this kind of security transac-
tion, specific both as to the debt protected and the collateral 
covered; rather it speaks of a "floating lien," or continuing gen-
eral lien, on a floating mass of assets-particularly those which 
change in kind and quantity and on which the creditor of neces-
sity must allow the debtor considerable "dominion." Moreover, 
instead of discussions of the simpler forms of security transactions 
our lawyer finds such topics as "When After-Acquired Collateral 
Not Security for Antecedent Debt" (9-108), "When Security In-
terest Attaches; After-Acquired Property; Future Advances" 
(9-204) and "Use of Collateral Without Accounting Permissible 
(9-205). Section 9-306 talks about "proceeds," a concept almost 
absent from the garden variety security financing. Each of these 
terms-after-acquired property, future advances, proceeds-im-
mediately brings to mind one or more of the horrid bankruptcy 
and tax lien problems which the lazy lawyer was too intelligent 
to worry about so long as he could find a way to create a security 
interest which avoided these problems. 
Article 9 contains almost none of the language derived from 
the law of the simple security devices. To the extent that the 
language of article 9 is not entirely new, it more nearly resembles 
25 Gilmore &: Axelrod, Chattel Security, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 521 (1948). 
26 Id. at 530. 
27 Id. at 541. 
28 See authorities cited in 4 CoLIJER, BANKRUPTCY 1f 70.19[9], at 1132 n. 39 (14th ed. 
1959). 
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the language of the relatively unfamiliar and newer devices of 
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (e.g., "security interest,"29 "pro-
ceeds"); and the comments use terms associated with the so-called 
factor's lien acts (e.g., "continuing general lien"30). But many 
good lawyers, even those with substantial commercial practices, 
have never had occasion to become acquainted even with the 
language, much less the concepts or mechanics, of either of these 
newer chattel security acts. For sound economic reasons, the vary-
ing state versions of the newest of these, the factor's lien acts, have 
generally been availed of only by the more sophisticated lenders 
and by them only when no other security device satisfied the situa-
tion even moderately well.31 It is perhaps not inaccurate to say 
that the Uniform Trust Receipts Act has worked so well in moving 
to market billions of dollars worth of automobiles, refrigerators 
and other hard goods that few lawyers have had occasion to master 
its superb but almost incomprehensible legal niceties.32 A lawyer 
may have automobile or appliance dealer clients whose commer-
cial life is dependent upon obtaining financing through the trust 
receipt; nevertheless, counsel for the dealer seldom even sees the 
form of trust receipt documents which his client signs. The forms 
were drawn and the financing supervised by literally a handful 
of lawyers who represent the specialized financing firms who do 
the bulk of this very important financing business. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that language and concepts of the Code de-
rived from the Uniform Trust Receipts Act do not make the 
average lawyer feel at home with the new product. 
20 UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS Acr §§ 1, 10. 
30 See u.c.c. 1958 TEXT AND COMMENTS 631-32; N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 45. 
31 The writer found that less than 100 filings had been made in Massachusetts 
under its factor"s lien act during the twelve months prior to the U.C.C.'s going into 
effect, while almost 30,000 filings under the chattel mortgage act had been made in 
Boston alone during the same twelve months. 
32 "The Uniform Trust Receipts Act is a perplexing maze of technical phrases wholly 
incomprehensible without an extensive study of the background and development of the 
security device known as the trust receipt. To avoid trespassing upon the traditional and 
well defined fields of such common security devices as the pledge, conditional sale and 
chattel mortgage, most of the act is devoted to definition, limitation and restriction of 
the arena in which the new device is to play its part in the world of commerce •••• 
Stripped of all technical verbiage a trust receipt has been well defined as 'a useful and 
convenient method of financing commercial transactions by means of which title passes 
directly from the manufacturer or seller to the banker or lender who as owner delivers 
the goods to the dealer in whose behalf he is acting secondarily, and to whom title goes 
ultimately when the primary right of the banker has been satisfied.'" In re Chappell, 
77 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D. Ore. 1948). 
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II. THE CONTINUING GENERAL LIEN AND THE FLOATING LIEN: 
POTENTIALS AND PERILS 
In the hope that theoretical difficulties may dissolve when the 
Code's provisions are applied to a concrete case, our lawyer de-
cides to use a current financing problem to test his understanding 
of article 9. At this point he sees the Code as a means of creating 
a single security interest, amorphous in character, both as to 
property covered (presently owned and after-acquired) and debt 
protected (presently outstanding and future advances), with the 
debtor being allowed to exercise unfettered "dominion" over 
the collateral. 
Suppose that our hypothetical lawyer is asked by his client, a 
small manufacturing corporation, to suggest a device by which 
it can obtain 200,000 dollars which it will need over the next 
year or two for expansion. Although the key executives have in-
vested their lifetime savings in their corporation, like so many 
modern users of secured credit the company needs more money 
because demand for its products has outgrown what can be pro-
duced with the capital supplied by its original backers. In spite 
of its success, the company has not yet earned the right to the 
required amounts of equity capital or of unsecured debt. The 
company officers have been told by their former employer that 
for an agreed consideration he will lend their company the needed 
200,000 dollars if they can suggest a security device (or devices) 
by which his risk will be protected in the event that the hopes 
and expectations of all of them should prove wrong and the com-
pany should end up in bankruptcy. 
From his reading of the Code our lawyer might draw up the 
following agreement: 33 
Louis Lender hereby agrees to lend to Widgets, Incorpo-
rated such amounts as may from time to time be agreed upon. 
To secure its obligation to repay such indebtedness not later 
than four years from the date hereof, Widgets, Incorporated 
hereby creates in favor of Louis Lender a security interest in 
all of Widgets, Incorporated's present and future accounts, 
chattel paper, contract rights, documents of title, equipment 
(including, without limitation, lathes, milling machines, stamp-
33 If this agreement now seems too absurd even for a lawyer who handles security 
transactions only as one of his many activities, compare the case imagined only a few 
years ago by a leader of the chattel security bar, 2 N.Y. LAW R.Ev. CoMM'N, HEARINGS 
ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1147-54 (1954). 
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ing presses, drill presses, cutters, shearers and other metal-
working machines of all types and descriptions), inventory 
(including, without limitation, steel and other metal bars, 
sheets, pipes, nuts, bolts, rivets, goods in process, and finished 
products of all types and descriptions) and general intangibles. 
Widgets, Incorporated shall be free to process, use, sell or 
otherwise dispose of any of the collateral hereunder, but the 
security interest hereby created shall continue in the proceeds 
and products of any such collateral, and in any other personal 
property hereafter acquired, whether as replacements or sub-
stitutes for such collateral or otherwise. 
[Date] 
Accepted: 
[Signature and address 
of Louis Lender] 
[Signature and address of 
Widgets, Incorporated] 
The parties in this instance might well have used as the "fi-
nancing statement" required to be filed under part 4 of article 
9 a copy of this ·agreement itself. We will assume, however, for 
the sake of raising the problem that they filed a statement which 
met only the minimum essentials of 9-402, namely, one which gave 
only the signatures and addresses of the debtor and secured party 
and an indication of the "types" of the collateral with no descrip-
tion of the debt. 
The parties here have no doubt created a security interest 
which we might call a continuing general lien or a floating lien. 34 
The use by the parties of a number of the liberties permitted (but 
never required) by the Code has this result: The parties in one 
instrument and with one filing have tied up a considerable por-
tion of Widget's currently-owned and, with exceptions, after-
acquired property to secure whatever debt may from time to time 
be owing by the company to this creditor. The lien floats from 
present assets to the company's interest in after-acquired assets, 
in whatever form they may be. Further, the company can dispose 
of any of the collateral without accountability. This hypothetical 
case gives us a convenient means of describing some of the ideas 
of the Code which are thought to be new, and to see the extent 
34 These two terms are used in the comments but neither is used in the text itself. 
See, e.g., Comments to § 9-205. These terms are not exact and are not synonymous. 
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to which they are new. We will therefore describe these concepts 
more fully before coming back to the question of whether this 
kind of security interest serves the purpose it is intended to serve 
for either the lender or the borrower. 
A. Scope of Security Agreement 
Under the Code it is possible for a debtor to create a security 
interest on all of his currently-owned personal property, tangible 
and intangible; further, he can do this with a single instrument 
which need only meet the requirements of an ordinary contract-
no oath, affidavit, statement of consideration, or other formality 
is required. To what extent does the Code here change the old 
law? In ultimate effect, not at all; in mechanics, considerably. Not 
infrequently, particular forms of acknowledgments, affidavits35 or 
oaths were required, differing from state to state,36 and even within 
a state for different devices. The Code goes on the assumption 
that these supposed deterrents to fraud are ineffective and are not 
needed. 
Under the old law a debtor could effectively hypothecate all 
of his currently-owned tangible and intangible personal property, 
but not with one instrument (unless state law permitted the use 
in one piece of paper of two or more separate security devices). 
He could secure a loan through a security interest in his fixed 
assets only through a chattel mortgage, unless it was the kind of 
property practically capable of being physically pledged. The 
conditional sale could cover the same kind of collateral but only 
in a transaction which resulted in the debtor's purchase of that 
collateral. In many states a chattel mortgage theoretically could 
have covered inventory as well as fixed assets but the mechanical 
requirements of description, recording, etc., made it practically 
unavailable. On the other hand the Uniform Trust Receipts Act 
35 Many cases can be found where security interests do not become perfected because 
of such formal defects as failure to file an affidavit of good faith. See, e.g., In re Urban, 
136 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1943) (no affidavit that chattel mortgage was bona fide mortgage); 
In re Leven, 42 F. Supp. 484 (D. Md. 1941). 
36 See, e.g., Maguire v. Gorbaty Bros., 133 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1943). The Second Circuit 
held that a conditional sale executed in New York, apparently in accord with New York 
laws, was not entitled to protection of the filing system in Connecticut which required 
a different set of mechanics. For a modern illustration of decisions which turn upon 
mechanical aspects, see Topper v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 191 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Ohio 1960). 
The question here was whether an affidavit affixed to the conditional sale agreement by 
staples met the requirement of the Ohio statute that an oath be "thereon." 
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and the factor's lien acts are by their terms limited to inventory37 
-(and accounts receivable and chattel paper produced through its 
sale), and the trust receipt, like the conditional sale, can be used 
only to secure the purchase price of new goods and not a loan 
against those already owned.38 The accounts receivable statutes, 
of course, could cover only accounts. Each of these devices has its 
own set of rules for execution, filing, priorities and remedies. 
Under the Code a single security agreement can cover any 
number of categ.ories of collateral. We might well excuse our 
lawyer for wondering whether the comments about rules under 
the Code being based on the nature of collateral does not miss the 
mark; if there is a change, one might quite properly say that under 
the Code there are fewer, not more, distinctions in rules based 
on the nature of the collateral. 
We may turn our attention now from changes in mechanics 
to changes in social philosophy. At least several decades before 
the Code was thought of, the idea was accepted that a debtor could 
hypothecate some, or even all, of his personal property. To accom-
plish that purpose under non-Code law the debtor had to execute 
a number of different instruments and, often, do so at different 
times. Under the Code he can do the same thing with one in-
strument. To the extent that requirements for different forms 
were intended to discourage the use of chattel security, the Code 
does mark a change in social philosophy-but only to that extent. 
To the extent the state has expressed its social thinking in specific 
statutes such as those on usury, requirements for disclosure of 
finance charges, and the like, adoption of the Code makes no 
change. 
B. After-Acquired Property 
The Code enables the parties in their security agreement to 
cover not only currently-owned collateral but also to provide for 
that to be acquired in the future. Again, the change from pre-
Code law is basically mechanical rather than substantive. Under 
neither the old law nor the new can an agreement create a present 
security interest in collateral which is non-existent, or even in 
37 UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS Ac:r § 15; Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing,'' 
47 IowA L. R.Ev. 289 (1962) [hereinafter cited Coogan, Public Notice]. 
38 Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured 
Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L. REv. 838, 845 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 
Coogan, Priorities]. 
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existent collateral in which the debtor has no rights. The question 
is by what mechanics can the parties provide for a security inter-
est to arise when the debtor does get rights in the collateral. Under 
the typical chattel mortgage act or typical conditional sales act, 
it was necessary for the parties to perform two acts at, or after, the 
time the debtor acquired rights in certain new fixed assets-exe-
cute a new agreement and make a new filing. For acquisition of 
new fixed assets, the conditional sale has been the most commonly-
used security device; in some states its twin, the purchase money 
chattel mortgage, was more common.39 Where the collateral was 
inventory, the trust receipt was the common purchase money de-
vice. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act popularizes a new concept 
in filing-let one filing cover any number of transactions within 
the period for which the filing is valid. This notice-filing idea was 
picked up by other security systems for the debtor's liquid assets. 
The debtor can, under differing mechanics of the Uniform Trust 
Receipts Act, the accounts receivable statutes, and the factor's lien 
acts, create a perfected security interest in new property with one 
act-the execution and delivery to the secured party of a single 
piece of paper describing the new collateral-sometimes requiring 
words of conveyance and sometimes not. But where the seller of 
the goods was also the financer, neither the trust receipt40 nor the 
factor's lien41 is permitted. Whether the financer is the seller 
or a lender is not important under the Code; the purchase money 
security interest is available to either, and without regard to the 
character of the goods. If, under the Code, (a) the original agree-
ment so provides, (b) the original filing was sufficiently broad, and 
(c) there is at the time an obligation to be secured, the debtor 
can provide that new property of any kind will automatically be-
come subject to a perfected security interest, excepting only the 
kinds in which a security interest can be created through delivery 
of possession (e.g., stocks and bonds).42 Obviously the creditor can-
39 It was generally believed that conditional sales were used very little in Ohio 
because one who used the conditional sale contract may have been obligated to refund 
a certain percentage of the purchase price in the event that the goods were repossessed. 
There was no similar requirement under the state's Chattel Mortgage Act. See generally 
annotations to article 9 in Omo LEG. SERV. COMM'N, Omo ANNOTATIONS TO THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE, BuL. No. 1958-1 (Reprint 1960). 
40 See Coogan, Priorities, supra note 38, at 838, 845. 
41 In re Freeman, 294 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1961); Coogan, Public Notice, supra note 37, 
at 316. 
42 u.c.c. §§ 9-304(1), 9-305. 
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not obtain possession of the collateral before the debtor acquires 
rights in it. 
But neither under the old law nor the new is an after-acquired 
property clause anything like the equivalent of a security inter-
est on currently-owned collateral. Under the old law, sometimes 
the agreement, without any intervening act, created an interest 
good between the parties; but the debtor could after acquisition 
of new collateral refuse to execute the necessary instrument or 
make the necessary filing to make it good against third parties. 
Under both the old and the new law the debtor can make an after-
acquired property clause ineffective by acquiring some or all of 
his new property subject to a security interest. Under the Code, 
and sometimes under non-Code law, the purchase money priority 
may be given not only to the person who directly furnishes the 
new goods43 but also to one who enables the debtor to get the new 
assets by furnishing the money. No state law can, however, pre-
vent a "transfer" of after-acquired property from being upset as 
a voidable preference under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,44 
if the transfer took place within four months of bankruptcy and 
if the other requisites of a voidable preferential transfer are 
present. And until the Congress or the Supreme Court clarifies 
the question as to what liens are superior to a subsequent federal 
tax lien, a creditor cannot assume that his lien on any collateral 
acquired after the date of an assessment, or at least after the filing 
of a tax lien, by the Internal Revenue Service will not be junior 
to the tax lien.45 This quick summary must suffice for a difficult 
topic. 
43 u.c.c. § 9-107(b). 
44 Bankruptcy Act § 60, as amended, 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958). For 
a description of these problems, see Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Under 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COLUM. L. 
REv. 49 (1962). It does not seem to me that the answer is necessarily as clear as that 
excellent article assumes, but the lazy lawyer is well advised to steer clear of the problem. 
In this discussion no attention is given to § 9-108; this section may come in handy if 
a preference problem develops, but again safe counselling may avoid that problem. 
But this writer finds greater difficulty in accepting the more comforting conclusions ex-
pressed by Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property 
Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 194 (1959). 
45 United States v. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958); United States v. Crest Fi-
nance Co., 291 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1961), vacated and remanded mem. 368 U.S. 347 (1962). 
For post-Ball treatment, see PLUMB & WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAXATION (1961); Myers, The Fall 
and Rise of the Security Interest, 6 PRAc. LAw. 60 (Dec. 1960); Plumb, Federal Tax Collec-
tion and Lien Problems, 13 TAX L. REv. 247 and 459 (1958). For an excellent pre-Ball 
treatment, see Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious 
Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954). 
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C. Future Advances 
The parties may agree to protect future advances as well as 
present obligations. Under some branches of the old law it is 
not mechanically possible to cover future advances because the 
debt must be described with particularity46 or because some kind 
of an affidavit or oath is required which must describe the debt 
in a way that would not include future advances.47 Under other 
bodies of non-Code law future advances can be covered,48 with 
varying degrees of priority given to those advances. The Code 
allows the parties to agree that a security interest will cover future 
advances/0 but, as we shall see in our discussion of priorities, there 
is also nothing in the Code that guarantees to any creditor that 
advances made by him at some time in the future may not be 
subordinate to certain interests in the collateral created during 
the time which intervenes between the execution of the agree-
ment and the making of the advance.50 And, worse, it is quite 
possible that advances made after the date of a federal tax assess-
ment will be junior to the federal tax so assessed.51 Under this 
arrangement, a secured creditor might well make some advances 
after a tax lien had effectively come ahead of his later advances. 
D. Notice Filing52 
The Code permits the parties to choose, with respect to any 
kind of device and any kind of collateral, between filing a copy 
of the instrument itself (provided that it meets the minimum 
requirements of 9-402) or a very sketchy document which does no 
4'6 For differing views on the specificity necessary for adequate description of future 
debts which are to be covered, see, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'! Bank v. Larson, 137 
Conn. 541, 79 A.2d 182 (1951) (specific date of monthly payment not specified); Word v. 
Cole, 122 Ark. 457, 183 S.W. 757 (1916) (description sufficient if record searcher put on 
notice, but intention to secure future advances not presumed); Frank H. Buck Co. v. Buck, 
162 Cal. 300, 122 P. 466 (1912) (need not specify nature of amount of future advances if 
can be learned by diligent inquiry); Divver & Gunton v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596, 599 
(N.Y. 1829) (chattel mortgage cannot secure future advances unless intent clearly shown 
on its face). The general tendency has evidently been to allow mortgages to cover future 
advances if they give sufficient notice and indicate the proper intent; third parties who 
search the records to find outstanding security interests are expected to learn specific 
matters on their own. 
47 The annotations to article 9 for the different states can profitably be consulted. 
See, e.g., annotations to § 9-204, Omo LEc. SERV. CoMM'N, op. cit. supra note 39. 
48 Coogan, Public Notice, supra note 37, at 312. 
40 u.c.c. §§ 9-204(3), (5). 
W Coogan, Priorities, supra note 38, at 852, 878. 
1!1 United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1960) (advance made after filing of 
tax lien but pursuant to pre-tax-lien real estate mortgage subordinated to tax lien). 
li2 Coogan, Public Notice, supra note 37, at 311. 
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more than give the signatures and addresses of the debtor and of 
the secured party and identifies the collateral by "type." This 
kind of filing merely indicates that one of the parties is or may 
become a secured party and the other is or may become a debtor, 
pursuant to an existing security agreement, or one or more 
security agreements contemplated to be executed in the future, 
or one or a number of security agreements not even thought of at 
the time the financing statement is filed. Under pre-Code law, 
sometimes no filing is required for conditional sale contracts; but 
where filing is required the entire instrument must be filed.53 
Chattel mortgage law, with a handful of exceptions,54 likewise 
requires filing of the complete instrument. Laws governing trust 
receipts, factor's liens and assignments of accounts receivable al-
most invariably not only permit but require the use of something 
similar to the Code's notice filing.55 
E. The First-to-File Rule 
Under the Code, considerable advantage may be given by 
9-312(5)(a) to the person who is the first to file with respect to a 
given class or classes of collateral. So long as the debt of the first 
to file is unpaid and the financing statement remains on file, no 
other secured party can come ahead of him except a purchase-
money secured party who directly or indirectly enables the debtor 
to acquire new goods.56 This is an over-simplification of the rule 
but will suffice for the present. 
F. Dominion Reserved 
The Code permits the parties to agree upon the amount of 
dominion over the collateral which may be exercised by the debtor. 
Some of the states, including Ohio,57 Illinois58 and New York/0 
have for many years condemned as fraudulent a security agreement 
which allowed the debtor to exercise what the courts later de-
termined to be too much "dominion" over the collateral. Many 
cases, usually thought to be epitomized by Benedict v. Ratner,00 
53 Ibid. 
54 See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-2-1 to -3 (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:28-5.1 
(1940); N.Y. LIEN LAw § 230-c. 
55 Coogan, Public Notice, supra note 37, at 311. 
56 U.C.C. §§ 9-312(4), (5)(a); Coogan, Priorities, supra note 38, at 857. 
57 Freeman v. Rawson, 5 Ohio St. 1 (1855). 
58 Davis v. Ransom, 18 Ill. 396 (1857). 
59 Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926). 
60 268 U.S. 353 (1925). 
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evolved the rule that where the debtor was allowed to use or sell 
the collateral without accountability, the secured party lost not 
only the collateral so disposed of but he lost any other collateral 
covered by that security agreement.61 The philosophy of these 
cases might be roughly summed up by saying that a secured party 
must act like a secured party at all times and not only in the event 
his debtor becomes insolvent. This philosophy was rejected at 
least a century ago in other states, including Michigan,62 Iowa63 and 
Massachusetts.64 Almost every state has cut down on the New 
York rule in some respects, through provisions in its factor's lien 
act and its accounts receivable statute. 65 The Code adopts the 
rule of the latter group of states; it leaves the parties free to decide 
upon the degree of control which the debtor may exercise. This, 
of course, does not mean that the creditor who imposes no control 
will fare as well as the one who does.66 Without the controls 
which produce the "accountability" the New York cases talk 
about, a secured party under a free-wheeling agreement may well 
find that, on the day of trouble, all of his collateral has been dis-
posed of and the proceeds paid out in dividends or advances-or, 
more likely, lost in the company's operations. The cutting down 
, of Benedict will be welcomed almost everywhere even if its main 
effect is only to eliminate the danger of some of the most far-
fetched extensions of the doctrine. 67 
G. Misuse of the Code's Liberties 
In our hypothetical case, the parties have taken full advantage 
of most of the liberties made possible by the Code. We might at 
this point ask the question: Would either an intelligent borrower 
or an intelligent lender, or the counsel for either of them, be satis-
fied with the security interest so produced? When our lawyer 
examines the first-to-file rule of 9-312(5) he sees that the execution 
of this agreement and filing the hypothetical financing statement 
would make it virtually impossible to get a secured loan (other 
61 Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926). 
62 Gay v. Bidwell, 7 Mich. 519 (1859). 
63 Hughes v. Cory, 20 Iowa 399 (1866). 
64 Brett v. Carter, 4 Fed. Cas. 67 (No. 1844) (D. Mass. 1875); Briggs v. Parkman, 43 
Mass. (2 Met.) 258 (1841). 
65 See, e.g., DEL. ConE ANN, tit. 6, §§ 1801-1807 (Supp. 1960). 
66 Coogan & Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on the 
Corporate Indenture, 69 YALE L. J. 203 (1959). 
67 Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926); Davis v. Ransom, 18 Ill. 396 (1857). 
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than one which creates a purchase money security interest) from 
anyone else without the consent of the original lender. This is 
not to say that there may not be situations in which a borrower 
may wisely tie himself firmly to one lender. 
In the meantime our hypothetical lender explains to his coun-
sel that while he has great confidence in his friends and former 
employees, he does feel that if he puts in 200,000 dollars he will 
in effect be a senior partner and is entitled to some voice in major 
policy matters. Here his counsel must say that this kind of security 
agreement gives him no control other than the influence he might 
exert by refusing to make further advances. Furthermore, the 
exercise by the parties of the privilege given by 9-205 may lead 
to the consequences previously mentioned-at the time of trouble 
there will be no collateral, or an insufficient amount of collateral, 
to cover the debt. He will also explain that any new collateral 
added during the four months prior to bankruptcy may be vul-
nerable as a preferential transfer. This is particularly true with 
respect to inventory. The lender will have to be prepared to 
fight off, if he can, the contention of the trustee in bankruptcy 
that each of the shipments of inventory received in the past four 
months constituted voidable preferences. Counsel might also ex-
plain that there are devices68 (none of which is contained in this 
arrangement) whereby this problem can be very much reduced. 
Finally, counsel must point out that if there should be a tax lien 
slapped on the corporation's assets, any property acquired after 
the date of that lien will be subordinate to it.69 
At this point all of the parties will be saying, "there must be 
a better way." 
III. OLD-STYLE FINANCING UNDER THE CODE 
Let us try another approach. Let us see to what extent we can 
do under article 9 what we have done under the old devices and 
the practices that go with them. 
One can look at article 9 with either of two pairs of glasses. 
If we wear one pair, as our lazy lawyer did (and as the writers of 
68 Use of a "revolving credit" mechanism not only avoids problems under Benedict v. 
Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1926), but also helps considerably in keeping the new security from 
becoming security for an antecedent debt. For a good example, see In re New Haven 
Clock & Watch Co., 253 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958). 
69 See authorities cited note 45 supra. 
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the official comments seem to have done), we emphasize every-
thing that is different from pre-Code law-its abolition of terms 
like the conditional sale and the trust receipt, its great emphasis 
upon certain defined terms, and its emphasis upon differences in 
rules based on these categories of collateral. With the other pair 
of glasses we look at those features of the Code which are mere 
continuations, with changes of course, of much of the familiar 
law. It is the thesis of this article that while one can ultimately 
understand article 9 either way, wearing the second pair of glasses 
will enable the reader to do it in a fraction of the time required 
if he uses the first pair. We might at this point suggest to him 
that he look at article 9, not from the viewpoint of what is new 
and different from pre-Code chattel security law,70 but what is 
old and familiar. 
70 There is no doubt that both the draftsmen and the sponsors overemphasized the 
degree of change made by article 9, but there are portions of the text and the comments 
which reflect a view different from that expressed by the excerpts reproduced at the 
beginning of this article. The first half of § 9-102 emphasizes the new language of 
categories of collateral. The second half is different: "(2) This Article applies to security 
interests created by contract including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel 
trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien 
or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended as security. This Article does 
not apply to statutory liens except as provided in Section 9-310." 
Vve earlier quoted a sentence from comments to § 9-101 which stated that "the 
traditional distinctions among security devices based largely on forms are not retained." 
The author of the comment goes on to say, "This does not mean that the old forms 
may not be used, and Section 9-102(2) makes it clear that they may be." 
Perhaps the better statement is that found in comment 2 under § 9-102: "2. The 
Article does not in terms abolish existing security devices. The conditional sale or bail-
ment-lease for example is not prohibited; but even though it is used, the rules of this 
Article govern." 
A few more extracts from the comments to § 9-101 are in point: 
"When it is found that a security interest as defined in Section 1-201(37) was intended, 
this Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction or the name by which the 
parties may have christened it. The list of traditional security devices in subsection (2) 
is illustrative only; other old devices, as well as any new ones which the ingenuity of 
lawyers may invent, are included, so long as the requisite intent is found. The controlling 
definition is that contained in subsection (I) [of 9-101] •••• 
"Under this Article the traditional distinctions among security devices, based largely 
on form, are not retained .... [Emphasis added.] 
"Under the Article distinctions based on form (except as between pledge and non-
posscssory interests) are no longer controlling •.•• 
"The scheme of the Article is to make distinctions, where distinctions are necessary, 
along functional rather than formal lines." 
The writer had no part in the intial formulating of article 9, or the original writing 
of the comments. He came into tl1e vineyard only at the eleventh hour, as a member of 
the subcommittee on article 9, appointed by the sponsors to evaluate the suggestions and 
criticisms made principally by those who were the Code's first guinea pigs in Penn-
sylvania, of the New York Law Revision Committee, and of the Massachusetts sponsors 
of the Code (of which the writer was one). This committee had the last clear chance 
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We suggest that article 9 be examined in the light of this 
hypothesis: Article 9 represents neither more71 nor less than a 
merger of the previously separate streams of chattel security law-
those of the pledge, chattel mortgage, conditional sale, assignment 
of accounts receivable, trust receipt, factor's lien acts, and the like. 
The merger has produced a more nearly rational set of rules72 
under which the parties can create, perfect and enforce any of 
the different kinds of security interests produced under the pre-
merger law, ranging from the solid pledge to something little 
removed, if at all, from a state-created priority.73 Any lawyer can 
easily trace practically every important concept, and even every 
important mechanical device either to one or more of the pre-
Code bodies of chattel security law of his own state or of a con-
tiguous state. The bringing together of these rules into one 
statute is the Code's basic contribution to a more orderly chattel 
security system. Contrary to the impression created by the Official 
Comments, only minor differences in rules are based on the nature 
of the collateral. Terms like "inventory," "equipment," "con-
sumer goods" are convenient handles to carry differences in the 
to find the flaws in article 9. The article was to a large extent rewritten. By chance the 
writer had the assignment of checking the comments to part I of article 9 from which 
all of the above quotations are taken. He did insist that the comments to § 9-105, for 
instance, be organized less like a dictionary and more along the "functional" lines the 
Code talked about so much. E.g., comment 2 brings together the terms relating to the 
parties, comment 3 those relating to the property subject to the agreement. But he did 
not at the time question the draftsmen's assumption that they had largely abandoned 
the old law, and had proceeded to create a new and rational chattel security system. 
The different view expressed here is pure hindsight. 
71 Its social philosophy on the use of personal property to obtain goods or credit, of 
course, differs from that expressed in late nineteenth century statutes; but the change 
in this philosophy had been completed before article 9 was thought of. On the other 
hand, as we have noted, the Code does not specifically repeal the types of statutes which 
set forth some social standard-such as a limitation on interest rate by usury laws or 
a requirement for a specific kind of factual disclosure. These may be limited by the use 
of the Code's convenient term "consumer goods" but they are still there. U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 
9-203(2). 
72 The phrase "a more nearly rational set of rules" is used advisedly. While article 9 
presents a tremendous step forward, only the uninitiated could hope that all the quirks 
and uncertainties of chattel security law developed over the centuries could have been 
eliminated at one fell swoop. See Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1319 (1962). 
73 Section 9-306, for instance, in words creates a security interest in non-identifiable 
proceeds under certain circumstances. But see In re Crosstown Motors, 272 F.2d 224 
(7th Cir. 1959), for treatment of a somewhat comparable provision under the Uniform 
Trust Receipt Act; Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 518, 531-35 
(1960). 
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business rather than the legal side of the security transaction.74 
These terms have the apparent importance they do because an 
earlier draft of article 9 had elaborated complete sets of rules for 
each category. When the draftsmen partially realized the extent 
to which they had brought all the old rules into a unitary system, 
they dropped the separate systems of rules but kept the definition 
in a place of honor. In the process of merging, provisions which 
were needed to distinguish between the law governing the dif-
ferent devices75 to a considerable extent became unnecessary and 
were dropped; along with them were dropped also the require-
ments (e.g., affidavits and oaths) no longer believed to serve any 
useful purpose. 
But even Gertrude Stein could not say that under the Code 
"a security interest is a security interest is a security interest." Dif-
ferences based on the functions performed by the different security 
devices have survived, almost without exception. This means 
much more than the survival of differences between the pledge 
and the non-possessory interests. The Code preserves, for example, 
the difference between a security interest created to finance the 
purchase of goods (a "purchase money security interest") and one 
securing a loan or other non-purchase money obligation (typically 
created by use of the chattel mortgage). Moreover, the Code dis-
tinguishes between the different purchase money interests repre-
sented by the pre-Code conditional sale and that produced through 
use of a trust receipt: the former is now a purchase money security 
interest in equipment of a business or consumer goods of a non-
business entity; the successor to the trust receipt is a purchase 
money security interest in inventory. Further, the old devices 
often did represent real functional differences. "Conditional sale 
financing," or "trust receipt financing" each represent a cluster 
of business practices with its own cluster of business risks. These 
differences in financing patterns not only may but should be con-
tinued under the Code, whether one calls his paper by the new 
name "security agreement" or one of the old terms like "condi-
tional sale" or "trust receipt." A code-created security interest in 
most categories of collateral may be possessory or nonpossessory; 
it may or may not be a purchase money interest. The form does 
count. 
74 See early drafts of what is now article 9. 
75 Coogan, Priorities, supra note 38, at 838, 845. 
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A somewhat far-fetched figure of speech may help to state our 
thesis in a different way. Every secured lender with any extended 
experience has learned to his sorrow that a security interest is 
not a policy insuring him against loss of the indebtedness secured 
thereby. Suppose we imagine that a secured party has four ships 
on which he wants Lloyd's (for appropriate premiums) to cover 
the risks that the various security interests do not protect against. 
The ship Conditional Sale will carry the lowest premium; typically 
the collateral is new, readily identifiable equipment; there is al-
most no risk that someone other than the debtor has a property 
interest in it; it is not the type of property as to which there can 
be a "buyer in ordinary course of business" who would take free 
of the security interest. The ship Chattel Mortgage likewise covers 
equipment, but there is some chance that the debtor doesn't own 
it at all, that he has given some interest in it to someone else-
voluntarily through another chattel mortgage or involuntarily 
through legal proceedings conducted against him by another credi-
tor. Credit insurance on the cargo of inventory carried by the 
ship Trust Receipt may be low or high, depending upon what 
the cargo consists of, and upon whether payment is to be made only 
after the inventory is processed or before the "trustee" is allowed 
to exercise his "dominion" over it. The risk that someone other 
than the debtor has a property interest in the inventory cargo is 
low, like the similar risk in the cargo of Conditional Sale. The 
credit risk on the cargo of Factor's Lien may be very high; its 
inventory cargo is likely to be in various stages of processing, with 
no cash coming in until processing is completed. Suppose pay-
ment of a debt secured by a cargo of raw wool is not to be made 
until converted into cloth, the cloth into accounts and the 
accounts into cash. At the time of trouble, some of the wool is 
still in bales and some has been converted into finished cloth. 
Both the raw wool and the finished cloth are salable, even if only 
at distress prices. But can the secured party realize on the wool 
which is at a half-way stage between the two? Pulling it off the 
machines will cost more than the price it brings as waste. Only 
a sophisticated lender can evaluate the risks here. 
In the past, we may sometimes have distinguished one ship 
from the other by the color and nature of the barnacles which 
attached to its hull, rather than by the cargo carried. The Code 
has stripped these separate ships of the barnacles which have 
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attached to each over the years, but it hasn't altered the fact that 
security interests created by different devices frequently repre-
sented different risks. If this is true, one should under the Code 
select his security device--or if you prefer, his financing pattern-
much as he did under pre-Code law. We may put it more strongly: 
while the Code makes it no longer necessary to create and perfect 
each kind of security interest through a different device, the law-
yer had better analyze his security interests along the ·old patterns 
if he is to evaluate intelligently what his client is getting in the 
way of protection. 
The first question, then, our lawyer will ask himself is: what 
device or what pattern of financing would I have used pre-
Code? He may follow this with a second: does adoption of the 
Code require any change in what I did under the old law? 
As mentioned earlier, the most commonly used security device 
in most states has been the conditional sale.76 Can our lawyer use 
that deyice for his hypothetical corporation? On inquiry, it turns 
out that the 50,000 dollars which his client needs now will be used 
to purchase a new metal spinning machine. We will assume that 
the spinner is not a fixture. We will further assume a schedule 
of payments which assumes payment in full well before the end 
of the collateral's life. Here is a specific security for a specific 
debt-no after-acquired property, no future advances on this part 
of the company's financing. How does one proceed from here? 
To use the Code's high-sounding language, how does one cause 
a security interest to "attach" and to be "perfected"? To shorten 
that a bit: how does one create a perfected security interest in 
equipment? Here we can assure our lawyer that he has been doing 
just that every time he has a client execute and file a conditional 
sales contract. For this bit of wisdom, your lawyer should be as 
grateful to you as •was Moliere's M. Jourdain when he learned 
from the philosopher he paid to turn him into an educated gentle-
man that he had been talking prose for forty years without know-
ing it.77 
But if we must analyze the steps, we can say that a perfected 
security interest comes into existence upon the happening of 
76 See generally SEIDMAN, FINANCE COMPANIES AND FACTORS (1949). See also Hogan, 
Financing the Acquisition of New Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 Bosr. 
COL. IND, 8c COMM. L. REY. 115 (1962). 
77 Mouw, THE WoULD•BE GENTLEMAN, in EIGHT PLAYS 346 (Mod. Col. Lib. ed. 1957). 
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whichever is the last of four steps: (1) the debtor gets an interest 
in the collateral; (2) the secured party gives value, usually by fur-
nishing goods or money, or commits himself to do either, thereby 
creating an obligation to be secured; (3) the parties reach an 
agreement which, to be enforceable against the debtor, must be 
in writing, except that delivery of the collateral is itself evidence 
of the agreement; and (4) public notice is given, except in the 
few situations, principally of a semi-commercial nature, where it 
is excused. 78 
Moliere's would-be gentleman would be amazed to learn that 
steps (1), (2), and (3) are taken automatically upon the signing 
of a conditional sale contract. But the security interest which 
thus "attaches" becomes only an unperfected security interest 
under the Code. Since an unperfected security interest may be 
defined as one not good against the trustee in bankruptcy of the 
debtor, we may be excused for not pursuing this concept further. 
We might here repeat that while under the old law usually a 
conditional sale contract could be used only where the parties, 
at least at the moment of signing, were vendor and vendee, under 
the Code one whose money enables the debtor to acquire the 
collateral can also acquire a purchase money interest. Sometimes 
under non-Code law the same effect can be created through use 
of a purchase money chattel mortgage, but usually the transac-
tion is then subject to a different set of rules. But again, this 
old pattern should be followed where feasible: vendor and vendee 
execute the conditional sale agreement and the vendor then sells 
it (chattel paper) to the lender. These steps may be taken in 
any order, but all four steps, including the giving of public notice, 
must be taken before the interest is perfected. 
Public notice may be given by delivering the collateral to 
the creditor or someone holding it on his behalf, or by filing in 
some public office. Some collateral, like stocks and bonds, can be 
perfected only through possession, and for intangibles, where de-
livery is impossible, filing alone is permitted. But usually public 
notice can be given by delivery or filing. (To be more accurate, 
78 A purchase money security interest in consumer goods and lower-priced farm 
equipment (other than fixtures- and motor vehicles) may be perfected with neither 
filing nor delivery of possession, but its protection against certain purchasers is less. 
U.C.C. §§ 9-302(l)(c), (d), 9-307(2). Certain trust-receipt-type transactions can be perfected 
for not more than 21 days-but again the protection is less than that gained through 
filing. 
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possession is the key; but that usually requires a delivery.) But 
delivery of the spinning machine here doesn't make sense, hence, 
filing is the only practical method. How, what, where and when 
to file? Filing here can be done either in the name of the original 
secured party (the vendor) or in the name of the financer, his as-
signee. 70 If filing has been made by the vendor, protection is 
thereby gained against the company's creditors; this filing remains 
good after purchase of the chattel paper by the financer, and assum-
ing that the lender takes possession of the chattel paper, vendor's 
creditors can claim no interest in it.80 But he may prefer to be the 
secured party of record, and this he can do either by making the 
original filing in his name or by filing a notice that the vendor's 
interest has passed to him. As noted, the parties may file as a 
"financing statement" either a copy of the security agreement, con-
taining the signatures and addresses of the debtor and the secured 
party, or they can file an abbreviated statement. The lazy lawyer 
will do well (at least until he has thought through all the problems 
of filing) to file a copy of the agreement itself. In any event there 
is no excuse in our hypothetical for covering anything more in the 
financing statement than this one specific spinning machine, de-
scribing it as specifically as feasible. 
Where to file is a matter of reading the state's version of 9-40 I. 81 
If there is a question as to whether an exemption from filing is 
available, the lazy answer is to resolve the doubt by filing; if there 
is a question as to whether to file in one office or more than one, 
the lazy-and safer-answer is to file more than once. When to 
file is easy-as early as possible, but by all means within ten days 
after the debtor gets possession of the collateral. One can file later, 
but this will be inconsistent with our lawyer's aim to do no un-
necessary thinking. If he files after ten days, he cannot evaluate 
the security interest so perfected unless he studies the rules on 
priorities among other holders of Code-created security interests 
79 U.C.C. §§ 9-401 to -407. 
80 The Code permits the purchaser of the conditional sales contract to leave it in the 
possession of the vendor of the original collateral and vendor (assignor) of the chattel 
paper if perfection against the vendor's creditors is obtained by filing, but this is one of 
those liberties under the Code which should be used only by one who is willing to study 
the effect of taking short cuts. Under § 9-308 another purchaser of this chattel paper can 
get superior title to it if he pays for it and takes delivery, so long as he does not have 
actual notice of the particular security interest of the one who perfected through filing. 
81 Haydock, Certainty and Convenience: Criteria for the Place of Filing Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 3 Bos-r. CoL. IND. &: COMM. L. REv. 179 (1962). 
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and he must study possible preference problems under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The lazy-and the efficient-thing to do is to file 
promptly and thus get the benefit of the special purchase money 
priority under 9-312(4). Since his collateral is not inventory82 
if he filed within the ten-day period, he need not even check the 
record, because his security interest is tops. 
IV. THE "PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST" 
The term "perfected" obviously comes from section 60 of the 
Bankruptcy Act. Putting that act and the Code together we might 
try this definition: A perfected security interest is one which gen-
erally is good against the debtor, most buyers of the collateral, 
general creditors (including any who later obtain a lien by legal 
proceedings), the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy, and the federal 
tax collector. It may be subject to a priority in favor of another 
secured party or the holder of a lien created by statute, such as a 
materialman's lien, or to the rights of some buyers. 
Suppose we test this conditional sales contract covering the 
metal spinner. Assuming no violation of a "police type" statute 
like a usury law which makes a security agreement void, this 
interest is good against the debtor. The debtor could cause the 
machine to be misused, and it may depreciate for other causes, 
but, unlike inventory, it probably will stay right where it is in-
stalled for a long time. By taking an assignment of the vendor's 
interest in the conditional sales contract the lender gets the ven-
dor's title, thus eliminating any question of the debtor's having 
created some other interest in the collateral. A debtor's equip-
ment is not the type of goods, like most inventory, which is held 
out for sale: no one who buys the spinner from him can be a 
"buyer in the ordinary course of business"83 who would take free 
of the security interest. The kinds of actual fraud which would 
enable either a lien creditor or a trustee in bankruptcy to set 
aside the lien are almost inconceivable. More in point, since the 
consideration was furnished at the time the security was given, 
no possible preference84 problems can exist (assuming that filing 
82 The requirements for inventory are more strict because there is more chance that 
there is a general inventory financer in the picture. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3). We are 
assuming throughout that the collateral is not a fixture. 
83 u.c.c. § 1-201(9). 
84 See generally 3 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 60.36 (14th ed. 1950). Since the ten-day 
requirement is aimed at establishing a priority, and nothing prevents perfection at any 
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was done not later than ten days after the debtor got possession 
of the spinning machine). Even the Internal Revenue Service 
cannot find any reason for saying that this security interest cover-
ing specific collateral and securing the purchase price of that col-
lateral is inchoate. All in all, the lender has a high-quality security 
interest. 
But our lawyer's client is going to need to borrow more than 
the 50,000 dollars this machine will cost. The chances are that 
there will be other expenditures required for new equipment, and a 
separate conditional sale agreement can be used for each transac-
tion. By a series of separate transactions he avoids after-acquired 
property and future advance problems. 
At this point we might bring in the oldest, the best and simplest 
of all chattel security devices-the pledge. We need not give it 
much consideration, however, for two reasons: (1) only rarely does 
a small manufacturer have anything pledgeable; and (2) the law of 
pledge has been carried forward in the Code almost in its entirety. 
If not enough money can be put in against new equipment, 
the next transaction to consider may well be a loan secured by 
presently-owned equipment-the typical chattel mortgage type 
transaction. This time it will be necessary to check the records85 
to make sure that no one else has an earlier filing with respect to 
either the particular equipment on which a security agreement 
is contemplated or a filing which, in general language, covers the 
same "type" of collateral. Suppose that the parties have agreed 
that the next 75,000 dollars is to be supplied on the security of 
certain large milling machines with an aggregate fair market 
value of 110,000 dollars. Taking an officer's statement that these 
machines are owned free and tlear as a starting point, our lawyer 
prepares a chattel mortgage describing the machines with rea-
sonable particularity.86 (We will assume again that the equipment 
is not a fixture.) The chattel mortgage is signed on behalf of the 
time, the bankruptcy act's 21-day period should apply. But to avoid thinking through 
this problem, our lazy (and efficient) lawyer will file within ten days. Compare Coogan, 
Public Notice, supra note 37, at 300 with Kennedy, supra note 73, at 529. 
85 Coogan, Public Notice, supra note 37, at 289. 
86 '\Ve will assume again that the equipment is not a fixture. The chattel mortgage is 
signed on behalf of the debtor. As pointed out in discussing the conditional sale, if a 
copy of this agreement is to be filed as a financing statement, it must also contain the 
signature and address of the lender. This is a new requirement of the Code. If the parties 
wish to file a separate financing statement, that also must contain the signatures and 
addresses of both parties. 
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debtor and contains its address. As pointed out previously in 
discussing the conditional sale, if a copy of this agreement is to be 
filed as the financing statement, it must also contain the signature 
and address of the lender. Although the description of the col-
lateral in the abbreviated form may be by "type," in this case the 
description of the collateral ought to be a verbatim copy of the 
description used in the agreement. In either case, our lawyer 
gets his own filing on the record. 
Before the 75,000 dollars is paid over, our lawyer checks the 
records in the filing office. Assume that he finds nothing on the 
Code records and nothing in any pre-Code filing system that might 
be applicable. After the lender assures himself that his debtor 
actually has possession of the collateral, he makes the advance, 
and it is this step which causes a perfected security interest to be 
created. 
Now let us change our assumption: Assume that the lender's 
lawyer finds on the record a financing statement in favor of Pneu-
matic Press Co. which claims "machine tools." Our lawyer's client 
shows him a conditional sales contract that covers a single pneu-
matic press. Can the lender's counsel allow his client to advance 
his 75,000 dollars? Could our lawyer give the lender an acceptable 
opinion? The answer is "No." While the mere filing of Pneumatic 
Press's financing statement creates no security interest, and the 
existing security agreement covers only this single machine, it is 
possible that Pneumatic might, through execution by the parties 
of a later security agreement, obtain a security interest which will 
take priority over our financer under the "first-to-file" rule. 
V. THE CooE's Pru:oRITY RuLEs87 
Even a lazy lawyer must know the elements of the Code's 
priority system. It does little good to create a perfected security 
interest if it may become subordinate to another security interest 
which absorbs all the value in the collateral. First, a Code-created 
interest is subject to any non-Code conditional sale or other non-
Code interest created by contract prior to adoption of the Code. 
Under 9-310 it is also subordinate to any statutory lien accom-
panied by possession of the collateral, such as one for materials 
supplied or work performed, unless the statute creating that lien 
87 Coogan, Priorities, supra note 38, at 838, 845. 
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provides otherwise. Such liens ordinarily can be created only to 
the extent of value added by the one who got the lien. We have 
previously mentioned the much more serious problem: the pos-
sibility that subsequent federal tax liens may come ahead of a 
security interest. And state law may create priorities for state 
taxes. Fortunately, losing out to one with a higher priority does 
not ordinarily expose the secured party to an attack by the trus-
tee in bankruptcy. But we are concerned mainly with other Code-
created security interests which come ahead. 
If the collateral is of the type regularly held out by the debtor 
for sale (likely to be inventory), one who qualifies as a "buyer in 
the ordinary course of business" takes free of even a perfected 
security interest he knows all about, unless for some reason he 
knows that the sale to him was wrongful. Here one must study 
1-201(9) to see who qualifies as such a buyer. This priority can 
be avoided by choosing collateral the debtor does not ordinarily 
hold out for sale-equipment rather than inventory. 
We have already mentioned the first-to-file rule. Section 
9-312(5) provides that where the two contesting Code-created 
security interests were both perfected through filing, priority is 
determined by the order of filing for the "types" of collateral 
covered by a given financing statement-regardless of the date 
upon which either security interest attached or was perfected, or 
the date upon which the parties first thought about creating the 
security interest in question. In our second hypothetical case 
above, what should the parties do when they find that someone 
has filed the apparently easy way by filing a blunderbuss financing 
statement which describes a single pneumatic press as "machine 
tools"? This is obviously a problem for the debtor and his counsel. 
Our lender can give no intelligent answer except "no" until the 
record is cleared or until Pneumatic Press gives him a satisfactory 
subordination agreement. Ordinarily the parties can amend the 
old agreement to claim what was intended-a security interest in 
this particular pneumatic press-by describing the press by model 
and number, and preferably by adding that a security interest is 
claimed only for its purchase price. With Pneumatic Press's revised 
filing on the record, our lender can go ahead with his own fi-
nancing-but not until then. Our lazy lawyer will explain to his 
client's officers why the filing of an over-broad financing statement 
is just one step removed from signing blank checks; and this one 
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experience is likely to be the only time that any of the parties 
unnecessarily uses a type of filing which is likely to produce such 
complications. Where a course of dealing is contemplated, this 
kind of filing is quite a different matter. As we have also seen, 
there is a big exception to this "first-to-file" rule: a purchase money 
security interest perfected in the manner and within the time speci-
fied in 9-312(3) or (4), as the case may be, will come ahead as to that 
collateral regardless of who filed first or whether anyone else has 
an after-acquired property clause in an earlier agreement. 
If one of the security interests is perfected by a method other 
than filing (principally by taking possession or by making a nota-
tion on a title certificate), the higher priority goes to the one who 
perfects first-i.e., first takes the four steps to perfection. For 
example, A files with respect to industrial diamonds on October 
1. He and the debtor sign an agreement, but A neither makes an 
advance nor commits himself to do so. On October 2 the debtor 
delivers the diamonds to Bank B, which makes an advance upon 
debtor's assurance that no debt is owed under the existing filing. 
On October 5 debtor obtains an advance from A. B wins. But 
suppose that A had actually made an advance the day before 
Bank B got possession and made its advance. Here A was the 
first to perfect, and therefore he wins over B's later perfected 
possessory interest. The point to remember is that one who per-
fects by filing cannot assume that the debtor has not delivered 
the collateral to one with a possessory interest; but, on the other 
hand, one who takes possession after an interest was perfected 
in the same goods through filing takes subject to that interest. 
There are other priority rules, the most important being 
the group relating to fixtures. Here the Code is none too clear; 
fixtures is not a defined term under the Code. The Code does 
say (but not as clearly as it might) that the only time one cannot 
retain a security interest in goods as goods is when they are "in 
corporated into a structure" in the manner of bricks, cement, etc. 
The first sentence of 9-313(1) thus sets out the boundary between 
what might be called "straight" real estate and that part-realty, 
part-fixture category to which the Code applies the term "fixtures." 
No method of perfection will enable one to retain a chattel in-
terest to goods incorporated into a structure. To retain a chattel 
interest in fixtures, one must perfect in the manner set forth in 
9-313 (2) (3) and (4). And to determine the line between chattels 
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which, like a desk, retain their personal property character re-
gardless of "attachment" to the realty, one looks to non-Code law. 
Often there does not exist the kind of non-Code delineation 
which 9-313(1) assumes there is to separate fixtures from chattels. 
The safer practical course is multiple filing: if the collateral is on 
the borderline between that, like a desk, which is always a chattel, 
and, that like a hot water heater, which may or may not be in 
the intermediate class to which the term fixtures can properly be 
applied, file wherever and however required by the Code, on the 
assumption that the collateral is a chattel and likewise on the 
assumption that it is a fixture. As noted above, the borderline 
between fixtures and straight realty should be determined by the 
first sentence of 9-313(1), but again there may be instances where 
the safer course is to file on the assumption that the collateral is 
a fixture, and obtain and record waivers from anyone known to 
have an interest in the realty, on the assumption that it will be 
found to be real estate. Under neither the old law nor the new 
can one operate in the fixture area with complete assurance that 
he has done the right thing, regardless of how much thought and 
effort goes into the process.BB 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Article 9 is, on the whole, a considerably improved model of 
our old chattel security vehicle. Its rules generally make the crea-
tion of a perfected security interest more sensible. Continued use 
of the old devices like the conditional sale, chattel mortgage, the 
trust receipt, and the pledge are advisable because many of the 
differing business practices associated with the use of one or the 
other continue to make sense. But the secured party will no longer 
lose his security interest merely because he operated under the 
rules of the conditional sale if a court later decides that he should 
have operated under the rules of a chattel mortgage89 or a pledge 
instead of a chattel mortgage or vice versa.90 Nor need grown men 
88 Coogan, supra note 72, at 1319. 
so E.g., Hugh banks, Inc. v. Gourley, 12 Wash. 2d 44, 120 P .2d 523 (1941). 
oo The difference between a possessory security interest (a pledge) and a non-possessory 
interest would seem crystal clear. But see the protest of a clear-thinking judge (Learned 
Hand) in In re German Publication Society, 289 Fed. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). Even this 
elementary distinction was clouded with metaphysics and "the intent of the parties." 
See also cases under the old law and other excellent materials collected in DURFEE, CASES 
ON SECURITY 462-95 (1951). 
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spend time in a court of law arguing whether a conditional sale 
agreement is good or bad because the paper containing the "oath 
thereon" was fastened by brass staples instead of glue.91 But this 
does not mean that there do not remain problems where adjust-
ment must be made between legitimate differences in interests 
between secured and unsecured creditors and between different 
creditors holding security interests in the same collateral. These 
considerations bring in the Bankruptcy Act and the Code's rules 
determining priorities between secured parties. Neither makes 
easy bedtime reading, principally because the problems each at-
tempts to resolve are not the easy ones that one can think about 
while inviting sleep. In general, the Code has rationalized the 
rules for giving of public notice as a means of avoiding a fraud 
on other creditors; the loss of a security interest held to be "fraudu-
lent" because of failure to give notice in the required manner 
should almost never occur. But if a small businessman, before 
opening up a gift shop, gives a perfected security interest to his 
wife to secure his obligation to support her, the fact that he has 
technically complied with the Code will be of little help to the 
wife if bankruptcy follows. Preference problems are a different 
matter; here learning to make each transaction stand on its own 
feet, both as to collateral covered and debt secured, is better than 
speculating as to whether 9-108 will control in a bankruptcy 
proceeding. Fortunately this same procedure will accomplish two 
other purposes: it will establish the best defense against attack 
by the tax collector, and will enable the secured party to know 
just what collateral from time to time secures him. 
91 Topper v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 191 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Ohio 1960). 
